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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state requests review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' November 3,
2014 substitute opinion in this case. State v. Larson, Docket No. 40091, 2014
Opinion No. 64S (Idaho App., Nov. 3, 2014) (hereinafter "Substitute Opinion"
(attached hereto as Appendix A)).

Review is appropriate because the Idaho

Court of Appeals decided a question of substance not heretofore decided by this
Court, in a manner inconsistent with prior precedent, that a prosecutor misstates

1

the law during closing argument by stating, inter a/ia, that intentionally pointing a
weapon at someone in an assaultive manner constitutes aggravated assault.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings In District Court And On Appeal
Lora Adams had a brief romantic relationship with Larson.

(Tr. 1 , p.185,

L.12 - p.188, L.20.) Larson did not respond well when Adams told him she just
wanted to be friends - he developed a pattern of being angry, then apologetic,
and he started to become threatening, acting like he was going to hit Adams.
(Tr., p.188, L.19- p.191, L.6.)
Adams and Larson were also neighbors in a somewhat rural area in
Bonner County and Adams had to drive past Larson's property in order to get to
her house. (Tr., p.181, L.9 - p.185, L.1.) Larson would stop Adams a couple of
times per week as she was traveling to or from her house. (Tr., p.200, Ls.4-13.)
At one point, Larson told Adams he was going to erect gates at the property line
and make her life a "living hell."

(Tr., p.198, Ls.6-11.)

As promised, Larson

erected gates across the road that Adams had to open in order to get home.
(Tr., p.198, L.22 - p.199, L.10, p.201, Ls.4-6; see p.213, Ls.5-22.)
Larson's confrontational behavior escalated after John Bilsky came to stay
with Adams for several weeks. (Tr., p.196, L.20 - p.197, L.18) Larson started
shooting his gun off in his yard and would call Adams, hang up, and go outside
and fire more rounds. (Tr., p.201, L.11 - p.203, L.5.) Adams ultimately decided
to sell her home because of Larson's behavior. (Tr., p.199, L.14 - p.200, L.8.)

1

There are three transcripts included in the record on appeal.
references in this brief will be to the trial transcript.
2

All transcript

One afternoon, after Adams sold her home and was preparing to move,
she encountered Larson waiting for her on her way home.

(Tr., p.207, L.22 -

p.212, L.17.) Before being confronted by Larson that day, Adams called Bilsky
to let him know she was on her way - a practice Adams and Bilsky had
established given the situation with Larson because there was a point at which
Adams no longer had cell service and the only way to communicate was by
walkie talkie. (Tr., p.209, L.24 - p.210, L.18.) When Adams called Bilsky that
day, Bilsky warned her Larson had been shooting his gun again.

(Tr., p.210,

L.24 - p.211, L.3.) As Adams approached the gate, which was closed, she saw
Larson laying on his A TV and reported such to Bilsky. (Tr., p.212, Ls.13-23.)
When Adams got out of her car to unlatch the gate, Larson said, "You
effin' skinny little bitch are you gonna to [sic] throw the cable in the snow like you
always do?" (Tr., p.213, Ls.11-14.) Adams ignored Larson as she unlatched the
gate to drive through while Larson followed her and yelled obscenities at her and
called her names. (Tr., p.213, L.15 - p.214, L.13.) Adams testified Larson was
"enraged." (Tr., p.214, Ls.18-20.)
Larson would not let Adams get back in her car, so Adams "tried to knee"
Larson "in the stomach or in the groin" in an effort to get away. (Tr., p.215, L.6 p.216, L.10.)

After that, Larson and Adams exchanged words and Larson

started punching Adams in the side of the head. (Tr., p.216, Ls.11-20.) Larson
stopped hitting Adams when Adams yelled for Bilsky but "somehow" Adams was
"flung" from where she was standing by her car door and she fell down into a
snow berm behind her bumper. (Tr., p.217, Ls.5-16.) As Adams tried to get up,
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Larson "shoved" her and straddled her on the ground and pulled out his gun.
(Tr., p.217, Ls.18-19, p.231, L.12 - p.232, L.21.)

Larson stuck the gun in

Adams' face and said, 'Tm going to kill you and I want you to be more afraid than
you've ever been in your life." (Tr., p.233, L.9 - p.234, L 14.) Larson spit in
Adams' face and grabbed Adams' throat and squeezed it until Adams could not
breathe. (Tr., p.234, L.19 - p.235, L 16.)
Bilsky, concerned that Adams was taking longer to get home than she
should based on the timing of her call, left the house on foot and went to find
her. (Tr., p.324, L.8 - p.326, L.2.) Bilsky whistled to let Adams know he was
there and to "hopefully ... get a shout or something like that." (Tr., p.327, L.21 p.328, L. 1.) When Larson heard the whistle, he straightened and Adams pushed
the gun away from her face and kicked Larson off of her.

(Tr., p.238, L.2 -

p.240, L.19.) By that time, Bilsky was there and Larson pointed the gun at him,
told him to leave, and said, "I'll kill you." (Tr., p.242, Ls.1-22, p.337, Ls.16-22.)
Bilsky said he was leaving and started to retreat but asked Adams if she was
okay.

(Tr., p.242, L.21 - p.243, L.22, p.337, L.24 - p.339, L.6.)

answered, "no," and Larson started shooting in Bilsky's direction.

Adams

(Tr., p.243,

Ls.22-23.)
Bilsky, who was also armed, returned fire. (Tr., p.340, L.19 - p.341, L.4.)
Although Adams and Bilsky did not see any blood or see Larson respond as
though he had been shot, Larson said he was shot in the chest and started to
walk away. 2

2

(Tr., p.246, Ls.1-8, p.342, Ls.6-25.)

Larson then kneeled and

Larson was treated for a gunshot wound. (Tr., p.638, Ls.1-21.)
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Adams thought he was "reloading," at which point she and Bilsky got in the car
and escaped to Adams' house and called 911. (Tr., p.245, L.21 - p.249, L.12,
p.343, L.2 - p.344, L.8.)
The state charged Larson with two counts of aggravated assault.

(R.,

pp.15-16, 49-50.) In Count I, the state alleged Larson committed an assault by
"intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent ability threaten[ed] by word and/or act
to do violence upon the person of Lora Adams, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a
Ruger 44 caliber revolver, which created a well-founded fear in Lora Adams that
such violence was imminent."

(R., pp.49-50.)

In Count II, the state alleged

Larson committed an assault against Bilsky in the same manner it alleged
Larson assaulted Adams; it also alleged an alternative means of assault - that
Larson assaulted Bilsky by "unlawfully and with apparent ability, attempt[ed] to
commit a violent injury upon ... Bilsky, with a deadly weapon." (R., p.50.) As
reflected in the charging language, the state's theory of assault against Adams
and Bilsky was based on I.C. § 18-901 (a), and, with respect to Bilsky, the state
presented an alternative or additional theory that Larson assaulted Bilsky in the
manner proscribed by I.C. § 18-901(b).
counts.

The jury convicted Larson of both

(R., p.126.) The court imposed a unified five-year sentence with two

years fixed.

(R., pp.171-173.)

Larson filed a timely notice of appeal.

pp.175-177.)
On appeal, Larson raised two claims:
1.
Did the district court err in allowing the opinion testimony of
Detective Johnston as an expert witness as to the science of
ballistics?

5

(R.,

2.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct?

(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 3
Larson's prosecutorial misconduct claim was premised on his assertion
that the prosecutor "misstate[d] the law in closing arguments." (Appellant's Brief,
p.11.) The alleged misstatement related to Jury Instruction No. 13, which reads:
"In every crime or public offense, there must exist a union or joint operation of
act and intent." (Instruction No. 13 (exhibit).) This instruction is based on I.C. §
18-114, which includes the exact same language except the statute also adds
In addressing Instruction No. 13, the

the clause, "or criminal negligence."

prosecutor commented that the instruction "is not a model of clarity" and
"submit[ted] that the word 'intent' in this context does not mean the intent to
commit a crime." (Tr., p. 795, Ls.18-23.) The prosecutor continued:
What that jury instruction speaks to is you don't have to have the
intent to commit the crime itself; you have the intent to commit the
interdicted act. That is, you don't have to have the intent to commit
the crime of aggravated assault; you have to have the intent to
point and point the weapon, use -- ... so in an assaultive manner.
(Tr., p.796, L.16 - p.797, L.1 (emphasis added, objection omitted).)

The

prosecutor completed his explanation by stating: "So not unlike a DUI, to put it in
context, you don't have to have the intent to drive while under the influence of
alcohol; you simply have to have the intent to drive the automobile. That's what

that instruction means." (Tr., p.797, Ls.7-12 (emphasis added).)

3

The state does not intend to address Larson's first issue in this brief. To the
extent this Court grants review in this case, the state will rely on its Respondent's
Brief for its argument with respect to this claim. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-11.)
6

On appeal, Larson argued that the prosecutor's argument "lowered the
State's burden of proof and left the jury with the impression that it could convict
[him] even if it found that he did not intend to make a threat or commit a battery."
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

The state disagreed, asserting that the point of the

prosecutor's comments in relation to Instruction No. 13 was to explain to the jury
that that particular instruction did not require a separate intent; rather, the only
intent the state was required to prove was the intent to commit the "interdicted
act." (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.) This is an accurate explanation of that
particular instruction.

State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183

(1993) (quotations and citations omitted); State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577,
580, 759 P.2d 83, 86 (Ct. App. 1988)4. Thus, the prosecutor's argument was
consistent with judicial interpretation of the statute upon which the instruction
was based.
The Court of Appeals rejected the state's position, noting that Bonaparte
and State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 88 P.2d 493 (1939), upon which the Court
in Bonaparte relied, "are inconsistent with more recent Idaho appellate authority."
State v. Larson, 2014 Opinion No. 64, p.8 (Idaho App. August 15, 2014)

In State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 580, 759 P.2d 83, 86 (Ct. App. 1988)
(citations omitted), the Court of Appeals stated:

4

[T]he criminal intent which is required for assault with a deadly
weapon . . . is the general intent to willfully commit an act the
direct, natural and probable consequences of which if successfully
completed would be the injury to another. Given that intent it is
immaterial whether or not the defendant intended to violate the law
or knew that his conduct was unlawful. The intent to cause any
particular injury, to severely injure another, or to injure in the sense
of inflicting bodily harm is not necessary.
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("Opinion") (citing State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 436, 13 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Ct.
App. 2000).)

The Court of Appeals specifically cited its opinion in Crowe in

which it expressed its "doubts" as to the "continuing viability of the Patterson rule
in light of more recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions indicating that guilt of
'attempt' crimes requires intent to commit the 'attempted' offense."

(Opinion,

p.8.) The Court of Appeals "conclude[d] that [this Court's opinion] in Patterson
and [its own opinion in] Bonaparte have been implicitly overruled and that by the
plain language of I.C. § 18-901 (a), assault by attempt to commit a violent injury
requires an actual intent to injure." (Opinion, p.9.)
With respect to the "second means of committing assault" under I.C. § 18901 (b), the Court of Appeals noted that the state is only required to "prove an
intent to make a threat" and that instructing a jury that a defendant only had to
have the intent to fire a weapon, but not the intent to threaten the victim, would
be an erroneous instruction. (Opinion, pp.9-10 (citations omitted).)
Applying the foregoing principles to Larson's claim of misconduct, the
Court of Appeals concluded the prosecutor's "statement was not consistent" with
those principles. (Opinion, p.10.) The Court reasoned:
The "intent to point a weapon ... in an assaultive manner" is not
the equivalent of the intent to cause a violent injury; one can point a
firearm at a person in an intimidating way but not intend to shoot.
Likewise, an "intent to commit the interdicted act" is not equivalent
to the intent to threaten. The meaning of the "intent to commit the
interdicted act" is ambiguous and could have been understood by
the jury to require only an intent to point the weapon. It is
equivalent to the intent to "perform the act committed," language ..
. we held to be erroneous [in State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 224
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P.3d 509 (Ct. App. 2009)], when a person is charged with assault
under I.C. § 18-901(b).
(Opinion, p.10 (footnote omitted).)
Based on this reasoning, and applying the standards for reviewing
instructional error, the Court of Appeals held "the prosecutor misstated the law"
and the district court "erred by overruling Larson's objection," but found the error
harmless. (Opinion, pp.10-13.)
The state requested rehearing in relation to the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the prosecutor's explanation of I.C. § 18-114, using language
from Idaho case law, constituted "misconduct." (Respondent's Brief in Support
of Rehearing.)

More specifically, the state submitted that whether cases

subsequent to Bonaparte changed the law regarding intent for attempt crimes is
not relevant to whether the prosecutor's explanation of Instruction No. 13 was a
correct statement of the law because the prosecutor's explanation of the
meaning of Instruction No. 13 was not itself a misstatement.

This was true even

if the Court of Appeals believed that the union of act and intent instruction was
unnecessary or even improper in this case. Moreover, even if Instruction No. 13
should not have been given, that was not the question presented on appeal nor
was it the objection made by Larson below.

Once an instruction is given, a

prosecutor is entitled to discuss it in closing argument. State v. Erickson, 148
Idaho 679, 685, 227 P.3d 933, 939 (Ct. App. 2010) (closing argument properly
includes the opportunity "to discuss the law set forth in the jury instructions as it
applies to the trial evidence").

9

The state also noted on rehearing that, besides being consistent with I.C.
§ 18-114, the prosecutor's argument was also consistent with aggravated assault
by threat because, even assuming the meaning of I. C. § 18-114 is inconsistent
with the attempted battery theory under I.C. § 18-901(a), liability under
subsection (b) does not involve an attempt crime, but only requires an
"intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of
another, coupled with the apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which
creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent."
(Respondent's Brief in Support of Rehearing, pp.6-7.)
The Court of Appeals denied the state's petition for rehearing but issued a
substitute opinion. 5 In its original Opinion, the Court of Appeals wrote: "Larson
also argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when attempting to
explain the meaning of a jury instruction that was based on I.C. § 18-114."
(Opinion, p.6.)

In its substitute opinion, the Court of Appeals recharacterized

Larson's argument as claiming "that the district court erred by overruling his
objection to the prosecutor's statements during closing argument regarding a jury
instruction that was based on I.C. § 18-114."

(Substitute Opinion, p.6.)

The

Court of Appeals also eliminated the legal standards regarding misconduct

5

In its Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, the Court of Appeals stated. it

"appreciated the filing of the petition and on this date has directed the issuance
of a substitute opinion" but "[b]ecause the ultimate outcome on appeal remains
unaffected," the petition for rehearing was denied. (Order Denying Petition for
Rehearing, dated November 3, 2014.)
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claims that it included in its original opinion. 6 (Compare Opinion, pp.6-7, 10 with
Substitute Opinion, pp.6-7, 10.)
language:

The Court, however, kept the following

"Larson argues that the prosecutor's purported explanation of the

mental element misstated the law and impermissibly reduced the State's burden
of proof' (Compare Opinion, p.6 with Substitute Opinion, p.7), but changed its
conclusion from "Because the prosecutor misstated the law, the district court
erred by overruling Larson's objection" (Opinion, p.10) to "Because the
prosecutor's description of the required mental elements was inaccurate, the
district court erred by overruling Larson's objection" (Substitute Opinion, p.10).
With respect to the state's assertion on rehearing that the Court of
Appeals erred in its analysis of the prosecutor's comments regarding Instruction
No. 13 in relation to I.C. § 18-901 (b), the Court of Appeals made the following
revision, which appears in bold:
Here, the prosecutor's statement was not consistent with the
foregoing authorities. The "intent to point a weapon . . . in an
assaultive manner" is not the equivalent of the intent to cause a
violent injury; one can point a firearm at a person in an intimidating
way but not intend to shoot. Likewise, an "intent to commit the
interdicted act" is not equivalent to the intent to threaten. The
meaning of the "intent to commit the interdicted act" is not
equivalent to the intent to threaten, the mens rea element
required by I.C. § 18-901(b). The meaning of the "intent to
commit the interdicted act" is ambiguous and could have been
understood by the jury to require only an intent to point the
weapon.
It is equivalent to the intent to "perform the act
committed," language ... we held to be erroneous [in State v.
Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 224 P.3d 509 (Ct. App. 2009)], when a
person is charged with assault under I.C. § 18-901 (b).
6

While the state certainly appreciates elimination of the word "misconduct" in
referring to the prosecutor's closing argument given that the prosecutor did not
commit misconduct, Larson's claim on appeal was that the prosecutor committed
misconduct (Appellant's Brief, pp.7, 11-16).
11

(Substitute Opinion, pp.9-10 (bold added); compare Opinion, p.10.)
The state filed a timely petition for review.
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ISSUE ON REVIEW

Is review appropriate because the Idaho Court of Appeals
question of substance not heretofore decided by this Court, in
inconsistent with prior precedent, that a prosecutor misstates the
closing argument by stating, inter alia, that intentionally pointing a
someone in an assaultive manner constitutes aggravated assault?

13

decided a
a manner
law during
weapon at

ARGUMENT
Review Is Appropriate Because The Idaho Court of Appeals Incorrectly Decided
A Question Of Substance Not Heretofore Decided By This Court, In A Manner
Inconsistent With Prior Precedent, That A Prosecutor Misstates The Law During
Closing Argument By Stating, Inter Alia, That Intentionally Pointing A Weapon At
Someone In An Assaultive Manner Constitutes Aggravated Assault
A.

Introduction
In explaining the union of act and intent jury instruction, the prosecutor

correctly explained that that particular instruction did not require proof that
Larson intended to commit a crime, but only required proof that Larson had the
intent to commit the "interdicted act," i.e., the "intent to point the weapon ... in
an assaultive manner." (Tr., p.796, L.16 - p.797, L.1 (objection omitted).) The
Court of Appeals found this argument constituted a misstatement of the law
"[b]ecause the prosecutor's description of the required mental elements was
inaccurate."

(Substitute Opinion, p.10.)

In reaching this conclusion and in

finding the error harmless, the Court of Appeals applied legal standards related
to instructional error claims as opposed to standards related to misconduct
claims. (Substitute Opinion, pp.9-12.) Because the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that the prosecutor misstated the law was erroneous and because its application
of instructional error standards was improper, review is appropriate.

B.

Standard Of Review
"In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court of

Appeals decision, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court
of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the lower court. State v. Boren,
156 Idaho 498, 499, 328 P.3d 478, 479 (2014) (quotations and citation omitted).
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"Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which the Court exercises free
review." ~
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court
exercises free review over questions of law." Kootenai Medical Center ex rel.
Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted).

A defendant who claims the

prosecutor engaged in misconduct has the burden of proving such.

State v.

Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59, 253 P.3d 727, 733 (2011) (citing State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010)). If the alleged misconduct is
followed by a contemporaneous objection, and if the reviewing court finds error,
the error is reviewed under the harmless error standard.

~

(citing Perry at 227,

245 P.3d at 979).

C.

The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate The Law During Closing Argument
Idaho Code§ 18-114 provides that "In every crime or public offense there

must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence."
Instruction No. 13, given in this case, reads: "In every crime or public offense,
there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent." Thus, Instruction
No. 13 was identical to I. C. § 18-114 with the exception that the instruction
eliminated the "or criminal negligence" language from the statute.
In discussing I.C. § 18-114, this Court has stated: "[T]he intent required
by I.C. § 18-114 is not the intent to commit a crime, but is merely the intent to
knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the failure to
perform the required act." Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183. Thus, when
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the prosecutor in this case said the word "intent" as used in Instruction No. 13 did
not "mean the intent to commit a crime," but meant the "intent to commit the
interdicted act," he did not misstate the law because the prosecutor's statement
was nearly identical to this Court's statement in Fox about "the intent required by
I.C. § 18-114."

Notwithstanding this, the Court of Appeals focused on the

prosecutor's subsequent comment, that "you don't have to have the intent to
commit the crime of aggravated assault; you have to have the intent to point and
point the weapon ... in an assaultive manner." (Tr., p.796, L.19 - p.797, L.1.)
The Court of Appeals concluded this was a misstatement of the law with respect
to both theories the state alleged in support of its aggravated assault charges
against Larson. (Substitute Opinion, pp.9-10.) This is incorrect.
Idaho Code Section 18-901 provides two alternative means for committing
assault. The first requires "[a]n unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability,
to commit a violent injury on the person of another."

l.C. § 18-901 (a).

The

second requires "[a]n intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to
the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some
act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is
imminent." I.C. § 18-901 (b). The state alleged the second means in relation to
both Adams and Bilsky and alleged the first as an alternative means only with
respect

to

Bilsky;

the jury was

instructed

accordingly.

(R.,

pp.49-50

(Information); Jury Instruction Nos. 16, 17 (exhibits).)
With respect to the theory of guilt as alleged in relation to both victims l.C. § 18-901 (b) - the Court of Appeals concluded the prosecutor's comments
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misstated the law because "an 'intent to commit the interdicted act' is not
equivalent to the intent to threaten, the mens rea element required by I.C. § 18901 (b)." (Substitute Opinion, pp.9-10.) The prosecutor did not misstate the law
when he repeated what this Court said in Fox in relation to the meaning of intent
for purposes of I.C. § 18-114 and Instruction No. 13.
The only remaining concern would be whether the prosecutor misstated
the law by saying that the intent to do the interdicted act was the intent to point
the weapon in an assaultive manner.

The Court of Appeals relegated this

portion of the prosecutor's argument to a footnote, stating: "Whether the intent
to 'point the weapon ... in an assaultive manner' is the equivalent of an intent to
threaten may be a closer question.

However, we note that this description is

hopelessly circular because it describes an element of the crime of assault by
using the term 'assaultive."' (Substitute Opinion, p.10 n.3.) That the Court of
Appeals finds the explanation "circular" does not, however, mean the explanation
was a misstatement of the law.

Even if the prosecutor's explanation was

circular, a circular explanation is not the equivalent of a misstatement.

The

correct standards that apply to a claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct
during closing argument by misstating the law require the reviewing court to
consider whether the prosecutor's comments were improper; if the comments
were not improper, there is no misconduct. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
716, 215 P.3d 414, 436 (2009).

In reviewing the challenged statements, the

Court does not attribute the most damaging meaning to the prosecutor's
comments.

~

at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (citations omitted). Thus, even assuming
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this Court agrees that the prosecutor's explanation of Instruction No. 13 was
"circular," "ambiguous" (Substitute Opinion, p.10), or even confusing, such a
conclusion does not mean the statement was improper or a misstatement of the
law.

See Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (declining to find

misconduct based upon most damaging interpretation of prosecutor's ambiguous
statement).
Moreover, it was not the prosecutor's duty to instruct the jury on the law;
that obligation belongs to the court and Larson has not contended that any of the
court's instructions were erroneous. As such, it was improper for the Court of
Appeals to apply instructional error standards to the prosecutor's closing
argument, which the Court of Appeals did in resolving this case. For example, in
finding error in the prosecutor's description of Instruction No. 13, the Court relied
on its opinion in State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 445, 224 P.3d 509, 513 (Ct.
App. 2009), in which it held the trial court committed instructional error by giving
the I.C. § 18-114 instruction and the elements instruction for assault under I.C. §
18-901 (b).

(Substitute Opinion, p.9.)

The Court of Appeals' harmless error

analysis also centered on harmless error standards applicable to instructional
error. (Substitute Opinion, p.10 ("Here, the harm produced by the error is akin to
harm produced by instructional error--the possibility that the jury reached its
verdict based upon an erroneous legal standard.").) As noted, however, Larson
did not raise an instructional error claim, he raised a misconduct claim, and, for
the reasons previously stated, application of the correct legal standards to the
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claim raised shows that the prosecutor did not misstate the law or engage in
misconduct.
Because the prosecutor correctly recited precedent from this Court in
explaining Instruction No. 13 and because the prosecutor's comments were not
improper or misconduct, Larson failed to prove his claim of error. 7 The Court of
Appeals erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court grant review and, on review,
find that the prosecutor did not misstate the law or commit misconduct, and
affirm the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts finding Larson guilty of two
counts of aggravated assault.
DATED this 5th day of January 2015.

JE~S/CA M. LORELLO
Dep~y Attorney General

7

Even if the prosecutor's statements were erroneous, any error was harmless for
the reasons set forth in the Respondent's Brief. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of January 2015, served a
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
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Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bonner Cour1ty. Hon. Steven C. Yerby, District Judge.
Judgment

of conviction and sentence for

two counts of aggravated

assault, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sally J. Cooley argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued.
LANSfNG, Judge

Richard Allen Latson vvas charged with two counts of aggravated assault for threatening
his ex-girlfriend with a firearm and threatening or attempting to shoot her new boyfriend. The
case proceeded to trial and the jury found Larson guilty on both counts. On appeal, Larson
argues that the district com1 erred by overruling his objection that a testifying officer ·was not
qualified to give opinion testimony concerning the direction a bullet had traveled. He also
contends that the court erred by allowing the prosecutor to make inaccurate statements during
closing argument concerning the intent requisite for commission of assault.

s

[)
j

I.

BACKGROUND
Lora Adams moved to Idaho and briefly dated Larson, her neighbor.

After the

relationship soured and Adams attempted to avoid contact, Larson vvas upset and made repeated
efforts to convince Adams to continue dating him. Adams later began dating another man, John
Bilsky. It is undisputed that Larson and Adams had an altercation, that Bilsky arrived shortly
thereafter, and that Bilsky and Larson both discharged their firearms. The parties sharply dispute
the details of the occurrence, but Larson was charged with tvvo counts of aggravated assault,
Idaho Code §§ 18-901, 18-905.
At Larson's trial, Adams and Bil sky testified as follows.

They said that Larson was

chronically abusive toward Adams, having repeatedly verbally and physically thseatened her,
and that Larson's violent behavior escalated on the day in question. In order for Adams to reach
her home, she had to travel over a private road, a po11ion of which passed through Larson's
property. Larson had placed two cables across the road at points on his prope11y, using them as
makeshift gates. Because of Larson's threatening behavior, Adams began notifying Bilsky when
she was heading home and would be passing over Larson's land.
On the afternoon in question, Adams called Bilsky to tell him she was nearly home.
When Adams came upon the first cable gate, she saw Larson in the vicinity and she relayed that
information to Bilsky. Adams got out of her SUV to move the cable so that she could pass.
Larson approached her angrily and drunkenly, shouted obscenities, and physically prevented her
from getting back into her SUV. Adams tried to get away, but Larson slammed her hand in the
vehicle door. Adams responded by kicking Larson. Larson then punched Adams and threw her
to the ground, straddled her, and placed his gun on her face, saying, "I'm going to kill you and I
want you to be more afraid than you've ever been in your life." Keeping one hand on his gun,
Larson choked Adams with his other hand until Bilsky arrived.
When Adams did not arrive at home quickly, Bilsky became worried. He grabbed his
revolver and walked from Adams' home toward the first gate. As he approached and walked
around to the passenger side of Adams' vehicle, he saw Larson.

Larson pointed his gun at

Bilsky and took a position at the rear of Adams' SUV. From that position, Larson told Bilsky to
leave and thTeatened to kill him. Bilsky took a position at the front driver's side of the SUV and
moved back and away from the vehicle, keeping the vehicle between himself and Larson.
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Thereafter, Larson, standing at the rear driver's side of the vehicle, fired several shots at Bilsky,
but did not hit him.
weapon.
firing.

Bilsky returned fire.

After Bilsky's second shot, Larson lowered his

Bilsky and Adams fled in the SUV, afraid that Larson would reload and continue
In support of Adams' testimony, the State submitted pictures of her injuries. Those

photographs depict redness circling the front of Adams' neck, over her trachea; red marks on
both sides of Adams' face with t,:vo parallel scratches on the left side of her face; redness on
Adams' torso; and a cut on Adams' hand.
Larson's testimony sharply contradicted the testimony of Adams and Bilsky. Larson said
that he went to speak to Adams because she had repeatedly removed the surveyor's tape placed
on the cable gates to increase visibility and refused to close the cable gates after passing through
them, leaving the cables in the snow bank. When Adams arrived at the gate, he respectfully
asked her to close the gate after passing through. Adams responded by apologizing for her
interference with the gate. As Adams went back to her SUV, Larson tripped and fell into the
vehicle's door, trapping Adams' hand between the door and the body of the vehicle and injuring
her.

Larson immediately apologized, but Adams attacked Larson, trying to knee him in the

groin. Larson defended himself by pushing her into the snow. While Larson and Adams fought,
Bilsky arrived at the area. Larson did not see him arrive, but heard him ask Adams if she was
alright. Before Larson could turn around and face Bilsky, Bilsky shot Larson. Larson drew and
repeatedly discharged his firearm until he was out of bullets. He testified that he "emptied [his)
weapon just instinctually" because he bad been shot and that he did not point his weapon at
either Bilsky or Adams. After Bilsky and Adams fled, neighbors who had heard the shots called
911 for help and provided first aid. Larson was taken to the hospital for treatment of his gunshot

wound.
Investigating police officers collected both Larson's Ruger .44 Magnum Red Hawk and
Bilsky's Taurus .357. When seized, Bilsky's weapon contained two spent shell casings and five
unspent bullets. Larson's weapon had been emptied by a neighbor who removed the empty shell
casings at the scene while providing first aid to Larson. Officers found six spent .44 Magnum
shell casings consistent with Larson's six-chamber firearm.
Larson was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, one count alleging that he
threatened Adams with a firearm and one count alleging that he threatened Bilsky or attempted
to injure him with a firearm, all in violation of LC. §§ 18-901, 18-905. At a jury trial, Larson
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was found guilty on both counts. Larson appeals from the judgment of conviction, asserting
eirnr at his trial in the admission of testimony and in allowing improper closing argument by the
prosecutor.

II.
ANALYSIS
A.

The Court Did Not Err by Permitting the Officer to Testify as an Expert
During trial, the court permitted jurors to submit questions. After each witness testified,

the court reviewed the questions with counsel and with the witness. After an officer testified
regarding his investigation, including his observation of damage to Adams' SUV, a juror
submitted a question asking whether the officer knew which direction a bullet traveled when it
passed through the driver's side mirror of the SUV. Outside of the presence of the jury, the
officer indicated that he did not know which direction the bullet traveled, and the court did not
ask the question of that witness.
Later, the State called another investigating officer. In response to a question by the
prosecutor, he testified that the bullet passed through the miITor from in front of the vehicle
toward the rear of the vehicle. Larson objected as to foundation, and the court sustained the
objection. In response, the State attempted to lay foundation. The officer testified that he had
"very general" training regarding ballistics, bullet travel, and investigations relating to bullets.
That training and experience consisted of carrying a firearm virtually every day for twenty years,
testing or practicing using his firearm to remain qualified for his duties, "some schooling in
shootings," participation in fifty to one hundred investigations that required determination as to
which direction a bullet entered and exited an object, and helping his "underlings at the sheriff's
department" work their cases. He also related his history of observing items that had been shot
during his career and that he had stated, "[g]enerally, when a bullet enters an object, the entrance
hole is the size or diameter of the bullet" and the exit hole is ''a bigger hole." He explained that a
bullet usually "mushrooms" when traveling through a medium such that its diameter ·when
exiting a medium is wider than its diameter when entering a medium. He explained that the hole
in the front of the driver's side mirror, the painted fiberglass portion, had a smaller hole than the
back portion of the mirror, the mirrored side. Over several objections, the court permitted the
officer to testify that he had concluded that the bullet traveled from the front of the vehicle
toward the rear of the vehicle.
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Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony and states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a ,vitness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
"The five sources of expert qualifications identified in the rule are disjunctive.

Therefore,

academic training is not always a prerequisite to be qualified as an expe1t; practical experience or
specialized knowledge may be sufficient." State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 82, 190 P.3d 896, 901
(Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Idaho Dep 't of Health & We~fc1re v. Doe,
149 Idaho 4 74, 4 77, 235 P .3d 1195, 1198 (2010) ("Formal training is not necessary, but practical
experience or special knowledge must be shown to bring a \Vitness vvithin the category of an
expert." (quoting Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183
(2007))). For example, we have held that a detective's training regarding Internet crimes against
minors and experience investigating those crimes rendered him competent to testify "in regard to
the uniqueness of screen names and the applications of Yahoo" even though the officer lacked
"specific computer program training."

Glass, 146 Idaho at 83, 190 P.Jd at 902.

The

admissibility of expert testimony is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court

will not disturb the lower court's ruling absent an abuse of that discretion.

Fragnella v.

Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 274, 281 P.Jd 103, 111 (2012); .J-U-B Eng 'rs, Inc. v. Securi~}I Ins. Co.
of Har{ford, 146 Idaho 311, 315, 193 P.3d 858, 862 (2008).

The defense argues that the officer's opinion testimony on the bullet's direction of travel
was "technical ballistics information" and that the officer never testified that he had been the
person responsible for determining the path a bullet traveled in any particular case.

We

conclude, however, that the officer had sufficient expertise and that the defendant inaccurately
characterizes the testimony as "technical ballistics information."

Within any domain of

knowledge there are more technical and less technical areas; there is expertise that can only be
acquired by significant scientific or technical study, and there are matters that are common
knowledge to anyone experienced in a particular field. Our Supreme Court recognized this when
it noted that an expert "may be qualified to render opinions about some things within a particular
professional field but not others." Glass, 146 Idaho at 83, 190 P.3d at 902. Accordingly, we
need not determine whethel' the district court erred by permitting the officer's testimony here
because he may lack the knowledge required to give expert ballistics testimony in some
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hypothetical case; we need only decide if the district court erred by concluding that the officer
had sufficient expertise to render the specific opinion he gave in this case.

In our vie,v, the mushrooming of bullets and the relative size of entrance and exit holes
are not particularly technical or arcane subjects. Both the deformation of bullets once fired into a
dense medium and the size of the entrance and exit holes on an object vvould be readily
observable to any person watching the process. One need not engage in extensive teclmical
study, take specialized measurements, or employ specialized tools of scientific analysis to make
these simple observations. We suspect that any person who routinely uses a firearm to shoot
objects or who sees the aftermath of such shootings as a regular part of their employment or
recreation could make such an observation. Here, the officer testified that his skills with a
firearm are routinely assessed, demonstrating his regular use of firearms; that he has frequently
seen the aftermath of such shootings in his work; and that he has participated in many
investigations that included determining a bullet's path. Accordingly, ,ve conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion by allowing the officer to state his opinion.
B.

The Court Erred by Overruling an Objection to the Prosccuto1·'s Explanation of a
Jury Instruction, but the Error Is Harmless

Larson also argues that the district court erred by overruling his objection to the
prosecutor's statements during closing argument regarding a jury instruction that was based on
I.C. § 18-114. Both the statute and the instruction given by the district court state, "In every
crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent." The
prosecutor told the jury that "the word 'intent' in this context does not mean the intent to commit
a crime."

Larson objected to that characterization, but his objection was overruled.

The

prosecutor then continued:
PROSECUTOR: [Y]ou don't have to have the intent to commit the crime
itself; you [need to] have the intent to commit the interdicted act. That is, you
don't have to have the intent to commit the crime of aggravated assault; you have
to have the intent to point and point the weapon, use-DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, again.
PROSECUTOR: --so in an assaultive manner.
Larson's objection was again overruled and the prosecutor continued by analogizing the instant
case to a driving under the influence case where the State would be required to prove the intent
to drive but not the intent to drive while under the influence of alcohol.
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By terms of the statute under which Larson was charged, LC. § 18-901, a person can
commit the crime of assault in one of two ways:
(a) An unlmvful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a
violent injury on the person of another; or
(b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the
person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act
which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is
imminent.
The instructions given to the jury correctly specified the elements under each of these
subsections. Larson argues that the prosecutor's purported explanation of the mental element
misstated the law and impermissibly reduced the State's burden of proof.
The State argues that the prosecutor properly described the applicable intent requirement,
relying upon State v. Bonapane, 114 Idaho 577, 759 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988). With respect to
the "attempt" form of assault defined in I.C. § 18-901 (a), that opinion states that "the intent
element of assault with a deadly weapon may be satisfied by proof [that the defendant] intended
to cause harm when firing [a gun] or that he fired it with reckless disregard for the risk of injury

he thereby created." Bonaparte, I I 4 Idaho at 580-81, 7 59 P.2d at 86-87 (emphasis added). The
Bonaparte decision largely rests upon the holding in State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 88 P.2d 493
(1939).

In Pallerson, the defendant was charged with the "attempt" form of assault.

It was

alleged that he, knmving that a home was occupied and in range of his shotgun, and unable to see
the home or the people in it because of darkness, nonetheless "carelessly, negligently and
wantonly and recklessly" discharged a firearm at a home, striking a person with a shotgun
pellet. 1 After a jury found the defendant guilty, he unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the
basis that the State had not proven that he intended to commit a violent injury.

The Idaho

Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that actual intent to injure must be proved.
The Court said:
Where . . . the injury is the result of reckless, wanton, and willful conduct,
showing an utter disregard for the safety of others, the la,v imputes to the
wrongdoer a willful and malicious intention even though he may not in fact have
entertained such intention.

The defendant sought to dismiss the information arguing that it \Vas duplicative because it
charged both assault and battery. The court overruled the motion, holding that other language in
the pleading amounted to an election to proceed solely as to an assault charge.
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!cl at 73, 88 P.2d at 495 (quoting Brimhall v. State, 255 P. 165 (Ariz. 1927), overruled by State v.

Balderrama, 397 P.2d 632, 636 (Ariz. 1964)).
We have previously noted that Pa!lerson and Bonaparte are inconsistent with more
recent Idaho appellate authority. In State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 46, 13 PJd 1256, 1259 (Ct.
App. 2000) we said, "[T]his Court doubts the continuing viability of the Patterson rule in light of
more recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions indicating that guilt of 'attempt' crimes requires
intent to commit the 'attempted' offense." We went on to hold that, with the defendant having
been charged with the "threat" type of assault under I.C. § l 8-90 l (b ), it was error for the trial
court to give a jury instruction that "the law will impute or attribute to the defendant a willful
intention even though he may not in fact have entertained such intention" because the instruction
diminished the State's burden to prove the mental element of the offense and, in effect, modified
the mental element from intent to negligence. Crowe, 135 Idaho at 47, 13 P.3d at 1260. Here,
because Larson was charged under both the "threat" and "attempt" types of assault, ,,ve must
address the continued viability of Bonaparte and Patterson.
For the last two decades, both this Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have held that the
specific intent to commit the "attempted" act is an element of an attempt charge. In State v.
Pmt!, 125 Idaho 546,558,873 P.2d 800,812 (1993), the Idaho Supreme Court held that when a

person is charged with the "crime of attempt to commit a crime ... the state bears the burden of
proving that the defendant intended to commit the crime." The Court credited the defendant's
argument that this conclusion is required by J.C. § 18-305, which defines attempts. Although the
Supreme Court did not specifically overrule Patterson, it did announce a general rule, and we see
no principled basis upon which ,ve could conclude that an attempt for the purpose of the assault
statute is treated differently from an attempt to commit some other crime,

Patterson and

Bonaparte are also inconsistent with more recent decisions of this Court. State v. Grove, 151
Idaho 483, 494, 259 P.3d 629, 640 (Ct. App. 2011) ("attempts are, by definition, specific intent
crimes"); State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 445, 224 P.3d 509, 512 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
it was error to give the general intent jury instruction for an aggravated assault charge); State v.

Swader, 137 Idaho 733, 737, 52 P.3d 878,882 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Attempt consists of the intent to
do an act which would in law amount to a crime and an act in furtherance of that intent."); State

v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,401, 3 P.3d 67, 79 (Ct. App. 2000) ("All attempts are specific intent
crimes,"); accord 2

w.

LAFAVE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 16.3(a) (2nd eel. 2003) ("An
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attempt to commit any crime requires specific intent to commit that crime; and so assault of the
attempted-battery sort requires an intent to commit a battery."); see also State v. Pole, 139 Idaho
370, 375, 79 P.Jd 729, 734 (Ct. App. 2003) (declining to apply Patlerson in a battery case and
holding that the mens rea applicable to a battery charge requires that a defendant "intend a
forceful or violent contact with another person"). 2 Accordingly, we conclude that Patterson and

Bonaparte have been implicitly ovem1led and that by the plain language of LC. § 18-901(a),
assault by attempt to commit a violent injury requires actual intent to injure.
As to the second means of committing assault, "Idaho Code § 18-90 I (b) requires only
that the state prove an intent to make a threat." State v. Dudley, 137 Idaho 888, 891, 55 P.3d
881, 884 (Ct. App. 2002); see also Pole, 139 Idaho at 373, 79 P.3d at 732 (holding that
"aggravated assault under I.C. § 18-90 I (b) requires an intent to make a threat, by word or act, to
do violence to another, but no actual intention to cause apprehension"). In Hansen, 148 Idaho at
445, 224 P.3d at 512, this Court found error in an instruction that diminished the intent element
where the defendant was charged with aggravated assault by threatening the victim with a deadly
weapon. The trial court there instructed the jury that "[i]ntent under Idaho law is not an intent to
commit a crime but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the act committed." Id. (emphasis
added). The defendant argued that this instruction was erroneous because it required only the
intent to fire a weapon, i.e. "the act committed," but not the intent to threaten the victim. Id. We
agreed and concluded that giving the instruction amounted to error. Id. at 445-46.
Here, the prosecutor's statement was not consistent with the foregoing authorities. The
"intent to point a weapon ... in an assaultive manner" is not the equivalent of the intent to cause
a violent injury, the mens rea element required by I.C. § 18-901 (a); one can point a firearm at a
person in an intimidating way but not intend to shoot.

Likewise, an "intent to commit the

interdicted act" is not equivalent to the intent to threaten, the mens rea element required by l.C.

2

We have also held that when instructing the jury regarding LC.§ 18-901(a), it is
sufficient to use the plain words of the statute. See State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663, 666, 84
P.3d 599, 602 (Ct. App. 2004). The common usage of the term "attempt" as generally
understood by the public is sufficient to convey to the jury that they must "find an element of
intentional action" in order to return a guilty verdict. Id.
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§ 18-90 l (b). 3 The meaning of the "intent to commit the interdicted act" is ambiguous and could

have been understood by the jury to require only an intent to point the weapon. It is equivalent
to the intent to "perform the act committed," language used in Hansen, 148 Idaho at 445-46, 224
P.3d at 512-13, \:vhich we held to be erroneous when a person is charged with assault under I.C.
§ 18-901(b).

Because the prosecutor's description of the required mental elements was

inaccurate, the district court erred by overruling Larson's objection.
Having found error, we must determine ·whether that error was harmless. Here, the harm
produced by the error is akin to harm produced by instructional error--the possibility that the jury
reached its verdict based upon an erroneous legal standard. For instrnctional error we apply a
two-part test:
[A]n appellate court mllst first determine whether an improper jury instruction
affected the entire deliberative process. If it did, then a reversal is necessary as
the jury's deliberations were fundamentally flawed, and any attempted harmless
error inquiry vvould essentially result in the appellate court itself acting in the role
of jury. However, ,vhere the jury instructions were only partially erroneous, such
as where the jury instructions improperly omitted one element of a charged
offense, the appellate comt may apply the harmless effor test, and where the
evidence supporting a finding on the omitted element is ovenvhelming and
uncontrove1ied, so that no rational jury could have found that the state failed to
prove that element, the constitutional violation may be deemed harmless.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (20 IO); see also Neder v. United Stales,
527 U.S. 1 (1999) (applying harmless error analysis to instructional enor).
Few errors "affect the entire deliberative process." For example, a defective reasonable
doubt instruction is a structural defect that vitiates the jury's entire deliberative process. Perry,
150 Idaho at 223, 245 P.3d at 975; see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). The
erroneous description of the intent element does not affect the entire deliberative process and
thus we may review for harmless error. See Hansen, 148 Idaho at 447,224 P.3d at 514 (wherein
we applied hannless error analysis to an analogous instrnction error).

We must determine

whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a finding for the defendant,
with respect to the omitted element. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19.

3

Whether the intent to "point the weapon , .. in an assaultive manner" is the equivalent of
an intent to threaten may be a closer question. However, we note that this description is
hopelessly circular because it describes an element of the crime of assault by using the term
"assaultive."
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In Hansen, we concluded that the instructional error was hannless because "the record
contains no evidence that could rationally lead to a finding for [the defendant) with respect to the
intentional threat element." Hansen, 148 Idaho at 447, 224 P.3d at 514. In that case, the "intent
to tlu·eaten element was not seriously contested." id. at 446,224 P.3d at 513. The defendant did
not claim that he lacked the requisite intent; instead, Hansen appears to have argued that the
State could not prove whether it was he or his associate who discharged the firearm.

We

concluded that there was no basis in the evidence from which the jury could have found that it
was Hansen who fired the weapon but that he did not have the intent to threaten the victims.
Likewise in State v. Thompson, 143 Idaho 155, 139 P.3d 757 (Ct. App. 2006), we
concluded that the judge's failure to give the required mens rea instruction was harmless error.
In that case, the defendant argued that the police lied ,vhen they said that he possessed drugs in
his pockets, asserting, inter alia, that his pants had no pockets. Id. at 159, 139 P.3d at 761. The
instructions given to the jury omitted an element of the offense requiring the State to prove that
the defendant knew the substance in his possession was a controlled substance. In that case, we
concluded that the instructional error \Vas harmless given that the jury's finding of guilt
amounted to a rejection of the proffered defense. Id. We observed that there \Vas no evidence
whereby the jury could have rejected Thompson's "pocketless sweatpants" defense, as it did, and
also find that he had a controlled substance in his pockets but did not realize that it was a
controlled substance. Id.
Both cases are consistent with the rationale of the United States Supreme Court's
harmless error analysis in instructional error cases. "Reversal without any consideration of the
effect of the error upon the verdict" ,vould result in needless retrials "not focused at all on the
[issues raised on appeal], but on contested issues on vvhich the jury was properly instructed."

Neder, 527 U.S. at 15.
In this case, we find the error harmless. Here, the jury was properly instructed as to both
prongs of an assault charge. It was also instructed, "You must follow the rules as I explain them
to you ... If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my instrnction you
must follow." Thus, the jury was told not to rely on an attorney's argument that was inconsistent
,:vith the court's instrnction. Further, even if the jury applied the lav,r as erroneously described by
the prosecutor, it necessarily rejected Larson's defenses.

Larson had two somewhat

contradictory defenses, and the State offered two potentially inconsistent descriptions of the
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intent required: "intent to commit the interdicted act" 4 and "intent to ... point the weapon ... in
an assaultive manner." Under any combination of defense and erroneous statement of the mens
rea, the error was harmless.

We address first the charge of assault on Bilsky. Larson's first defense was that Bilsky
shot first and Larson acted in self-defense. The jury was instructed regarding self-defense and
necessarily rejected that defense in finding Larson guilty of an aggravated assault on Bilsky. The
erroneous mens rea description could not have affected the jury's determination of the selfdefense claim.
Larson's second defense was that he reflexively fired his gun without aiming it at anyone.
Even if we assume that the jury applied the "intent to commit the interdicted act" mens rea, as
described by the prosecutor, in the manner most detrimental to Larson, the jury must have found
that Larson intended to point or fire his gun, rejecting the mistake or reflex defense. Likewise, a
jury dete1rnination that Larson "inten[ded] to ... point the weapon ... in an assaultive manner"
also rejects the reflex or mistake defense.
We similarly conclude that with respect to the charge of assault on Adams, the jury
necessarily rejected Larson's defense and that any erroneous description of the mental element
did not affect the verdict. As to that count, the State's evidence was that Larson put his firearm
on Adams' face and said, "I'm going to kill you and I want yoll to be more afraid than you've
ever been in your life." If Larson intended to commit that "interdicted act" (putting the firearm
on Adams' face), he certainly intended to threaten Adams.

Larson did not contend that he

performed this act but without intent to threaten; be testified that he did not do it at all. The jury
rejected that contention. No rational jury could conclude that Larson pressed the weapon to
Adams' face but did so without intent to threaten.
There is no version of the facts presented in the trial evidence that could rationally
support a finding that Larson intentionally fired his gun without intent to threaten or injure
4

This Court has used the phrase "interdicted act" in modern opinions because that term
was used as a term of art in older cases. See, e.g., State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 78, 310 P.2d
1082, l 083 (1957); Stcae v. Tc~Jl/or, 59 Idaho 724, 73 8, 87 P.2d 454, 460 (1939); State v. Billings,
137 Idaho 827, 830, 54 P.3d 470, 473 (Ct. App. 2002). However, the phrase is not commonly
used by either laVi'yers or laypeople and could easily be misunderstood. Therefore, in our view,
use of that term to explain an issue to ajmy is unhelpful and should be avoided.
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Bilsky, or intentionally pressed his gun against Adams' face without the intent lo threaten her.
Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the prosecutor's erroneous mens rea description
affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, a retrial v,1ould serve only to permit Larson to
relitigate defenses that the jury rejected. Therefore, we conclude that the error was harmiess.

III.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err by permitting the officer to testify to his opinion on the
direction of travel of a bullet. Although we conclude that the district comt erred by failing to
sustain Larson's objection when the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the intent element for
assault, this error was harmless on the facts of this case.

Accordingly, the judgment of

conviction is affirmed.
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
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